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·MATRICIDAL MAGISTRATES AND GAMBLING GODS: 
WEAK STATES AND STRONG SPIRITS IN CHINA* 
Robert P. Weller 
Chinese gods tempt us to think of them as staid and sober imperial 
bureaucrats. Most of them dress in official-looking robes, live in guarded 
yamens (official headquarters), spend their time reading formal petitions, and 
respond by giving stern orders to their underlings while glancing over their 
shoulders at their superiors. Like all proper bureaucrats, they flaunt their ranks 
and titles, and proudly display encomia from higher officials in front of their 
offices. When asking my fortune in Taiwan I was typically told to report my 
full name, address and birthday so the god could pull the right file. 
Yet as we learn more about these exemplars of authority, we keep seeing 
hints of dark pasts and hidden inner lives. Gender immediately raises 
problems for the bureaucratic image of some important deities - several of 
the most popular are female. Origin stories also often leave clues of religious 
retreat, military prowess, self-mutilation, suicide, and other quite non-
bureaucratic behaviour. Popular tales and local operas about ·gods reveal 
personal lives far from the formalities of the yamen. Worse still, all kinds of 
quite unbureaucratic spirits command worship. Many districts barbour temples 
to stones, foxes, turtles or dogs, to the pitiful corpses of unwed virgins or the 
mangled remains of battlefield victims, to inebriated priests or executed 
A substantially similar version of this article will appear in a volume tentatively titled 
Divinity and Society in China: Shaping and Transmitting Gods ' Cults, edited by Meir 
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thieves. Hidden beneath the folds of their dragon robes, many gods harbour 
unbureaucratic traces of death and desire. I 
Occasionally, communities seem to abandon the bureaucratic facade 
completely, letting death and desire step out from their hiding places. This 
paper explores two such cases, one in east-central Guangxi in the 1840s, and 
the other in Taiwan in the 1980s. 
The Xiangzhou region of Guangxi contained very few temples to 
officially approved bureaucrats. Their most respectable deities were three 
Daoist hermits, who bore little figurative or literal relationship to the officially 
approved hierarchy of gods. King Gan rivalled them in importance. While still 
alive, he had murdered his mother as a stepping stone toward official position, 
and was known during his lifetime for extorting large payments from the local 
magistrate. 
The second case, from Taiwan, features the popular apotheosis of humble 
ghosts into powerful patrons, some of them anonymous victims of violent 
ends and others known criminals, who tend to favour seedy requests from 
gamblers, prostitutes and gangsters. As shall be seen, one such temple in the 
1980s developed into a clear rival of the island's most famous and important 
temples to more typical gods, attracting thousands of visitors every day to 
offer cigarettes to seventeen dead bodies and a dog. 
These two quite disparate cases force us to ask what conditions the 
waxing and waning of the bureaucratic image of gods, even though they only 
begin to suggest possible answers. At a broader level, they pose the old 
problem of cultural variation in China. How far do social and historical 
changes condition cultural variation, and to what extent do Chinese instead 
share a unified culture? The problem first came up sharply for studies of 
Chinese religion in the classic debate between Maurice Freedman and Arthur 
Wolf.2 Freedman believed in a kind of shared Chinese cultural essence, and 
argued for the assumption that 'a Chinese religion exists' .3 Wolf argued the 
opposite: 'We should begin by reconstructing the beliefs of people who 
viewed the Chinese social landscape from different perspectives ... The fact 
that an idea was shared by people with such very different perspectives would 
suggest to me that it was relatively insignificant or that it was easily invested 
with very different meanings' .4 While the debate has been greatly refined in 
the two decades since then, the. basic question remains as vexed as ever. 
2 
3 
4 
Many of these issues will be explored in greater depth in Shahar and Weller, Divinity 
and Society in China. 
The argument appeared in Arthur Wolf (ed.), Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974). Wolfs 'Introduction' (pp.1-18) took issue 
with Maurice Freedman's essay, 'On the Sociological Study of Chinese Religion' 
(pp.19-41). 
Freedman, 'On the Sociological Study' , p.20. 
Wolf, 'Introduction' , p.9. 
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The material I present here moves away from one aspect of Wolf's work 
on religion. His simple triad of gods as bureaucrats, ancestors as kin, and 
ghosts as the liminal margins disguises much of the troublesome ambiguity 
and contradiction within the entire system. The image of gods as bureaucrats 
obscures many of their most interesting features. Yet, at a deeper level, cases 
like the two I will discuss force us closer to some position like Wolf's: that 
Chinese religious interpretation moves hand in hand with social change. The 
difference from Wolf is less in fundamental outlook than in the clearer view 
we now have of the tensions and pressures inherent in both Chinese religion 
and society. 
The variability of gods suggests two lines of thought that I will begin to 
explore here. First, it seems reasonable to expect that bureaucrats themselves 
would strongly promote the metaphor of an equally bureaucratic heaven for 
popular consumption, and that gods might lose their official covering with a 
decrease in state power over religion. Second, the social relations of religious 
interpretation in China appear to have been so loose that a wide set of 
alternative possibilities lay dormant in the system even under the strongest 
state control, allowing an easy transition to new sorts of gods when 
circumstances changed. Perhaps what people shared was not the set of ruling 
ideas that Freedman expected, but instead a group of unruly ideas, a 
disorganized set of possibilities that was always ready to move off in different 
directions. 
Matricide and Potent Gods 
East-central Guangxi spawned the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in 1850. One 
of the fortunate side effects of the upheaval was a fuller description of the area 
than we usually see for peripheral parts of China. Many Taiping sources 
supplement the local gazetteers, and scholars have solicited oral histories since 
the early twentieth century. 5 It is now possible to outline a general picture of 
god worship in the Thistle Mountain region, a distant hinterland in Guiping 
county, in the years just before it became one of the early Taiping base areas. 
The most important community temples in the entire region honoured the 
Three Generations (San lie). These were three members of the Feng family, 
scattered over several centuries, each of whom reached the heights of Daoist 
perfection. The most recent beatification occurred in the seventeenth century, 
and the cult began soon thereafter with a temple in neighbouring Gui county . 
Temples to the Three Generations soon spread throughout the region.6 People 
I interviewed remembered six temples in the Thistle Mountain region alone. 
The Three Generations are as close as the district came in the 1840s to the 
model of community bureaucrats we know from more central parts of China. 
They sponsored community rites of renewal (jiao) every few years, and local 
5 I also conducted interviews there in 1985. 
6 See the Guiping xianzhi [Guiping County Gazetteer], 1920, juan 15:10. 
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elites probably controlled their temples. When one wealthy landlord created 
an early self-defense force in the 1840s to stem the rising tide of banditry and 
unrest, he placed the headquarters in the Three Generations temple at 
Daxuanxu, a major market town near Thistle Mountain. 7 
Yet as a rule Daoist saints are miracle-dealing mountain hermits, not 
paper-pushing bureaucrats. The Three Generations had a purely local 
following with no ties to officialdom either through their origins or through 
any imperial deification. They recall an earlier Chinese tradition where most 
gods were purely local saints and worthies, before the state began 
systematically to promote and coopt local deities in the Song Dynasty, 
enlisting them as allies and appendages of local government. 8 While these 
temples functioned much like bureaucratic community temples, their roots 
grew firmly in local history, not national hierarchy. 
In contrast, their main rival for community authority did draw on the 
bureaucratic metaphor, but only to undermine its legitimacy. King Gan had 
indeed earned high office when he was alive, and at least five local temples 
honoured him. His cult held jiao rites of renewal, and the local gazetteer 
mentions no other deities besides King Gan and the Three Generations who 
performed this major community function.9 In some ways King Gan's 
popularity even surpassed that of the Three Generations. I was told that 
worship of King Gan has revived at some temples in the 1980s, but the 
standing Three Generations temples remain empty shells. 
Both King Gan's origins and his reported actions while still human mock 
any claims to bureaucratic respectability, however. A geomancer identified a 
family burial site that would guarantee high office for him, but only if he took 
advantage of it immediately. Lacking any convenient corpses, but anxious to 
answer when opportunity knocked, he slaughtered his mother and buried her 
in just the right spot. The sacrifice of filial piety to personal ambition worked 
perfectly, and he quickly rose to secular success as an official, and then 
heavenly success as a god. 
King Gan's posthumous actions as a diety further enhanced his image. 
The local magistrate once passed near his temple. King Gan seized a young 
boy, and speaking through the child's mouth demanded that the magistrate 
step down from his sedan chair and worship in the temple. The magistrate 
7 
8 
9 
Guangxi shifan xueyuan shidixi 72 ji, 'Taiping tianguo qiyi jige wenti de diaocha' 
[Investigation Into Several Questions Concerning the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 
Uprising], in Guangxi Taiping tianguoshi yanjiuhui (ed.), Taiping tianguoshi yanjiu 
wenxuan [Selected Research on the History of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom], 
(Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1981), p.272. 
Valerie Hansen, Changing Gods in Medieval China, 1127-1276 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), pp.160-6. 
Xia Jingyi (compiler), Xunzhou fuzhi [Xunzhou Prefecture Gazetteer] (1897), juan 
54:67. 
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complied, and even went along when King Gan demanded an extremely 
expensive set of official robes as a gift. The god emphasized his power by 
abusing the system whose authority and robes of office he claimed. He acted 
like the local strongmen who sometimes usurped state authority and ran their 
own little empires where the state grew weak. The local gazetteer also accused 
the temple of inspiring people to sing obscene songs.JO Instead of legitimizing 
government through the bureaucratic metaphor, King Gan rendered it 
ludicrous. 
No other temples rivalled King Gan or the Three Generations in 
community standing, but several had major followings and none made the 
least pretence to bureaucratic respectability. The most infamous was the 
Liuwu temple, because Hong Xiuquan, the Taiping leader, had denounced it 
for corrupting the population. Local legend tells that a failed official degree 
candidate fell in love with a woman singing on Liuwu mountain. They sang 
together for seven days and nights. When they suddenly died on the seventh 
night, ants buried their bodies. Like King Gan, they would also extort worship 
out of people, sending anything from snake attacks to stomach aches to plague 
those who showed too little respect. II The paired singing reflects local Zhuang 
tradition, and the legend clearly fits Han repugnance at what was seen as 
profligate sexual licence. Much like King Gan, the temple combined images 
of improper death, reliance on extortion to command worship, and dark hints 
of sex, with temple origins tied to strictly local history. 
Informants also told of a Thistle Mountain temple to Grandaunt Liu (Liu 
Dagupuo). She was the spirit of a girl who had died young and childless, and 
who performed many good deeds in both life and death. Such stories are also 
familiar to us from other patis of China. Dead virgins pose a problem for 
ancestor worship - they have no descendants to worship them, and they may 
behave as angry ghosts if left unworshipped. Taiwanese often resolve this 
problem by building small girls' temples (guniang miao) where passers-by 
may stop to burn a little incense.I2 They resemble ghost temples both 
10 
11 
12 
This description is based on the Taiping Tianri in Franz Michael (ed.), in collaboration 
with Chang Chung-li, The Taiping Rebellion: Hist01y and Documents (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1966-1971), pp.73-6; Hong Rengan's confession (also 
collected in Michael, The Taiping Rebellion, p.l519); Theodore Hamberg's The Visions 
of Hung-siu-tshuen and the Origin of the Kwang-si Insurrection (Hong Kong: China 
Mail, 1854), pp.36-7; Xia Jingyi (compiler), Xunzhou Fuzhi, juan 54:87); and my own 
interviews. 
Guangxi zhuangzu zizhiqu tongzhiguan (compiler), Taiping tianguo geming zai Guangxi 
diaocha ziliao huipian [Compiled Materials from the Investigation of the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom Revolution · in Guangxi] (Nanning: Guangxi zhuangzu zizhiqu 
renrnin chubanshe, 1962), p.49. 
Arthur P. Wolf, 'Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors', in Arthur P. Wolf (ed.), Religion and 
Ritual in Chinese Society (Stanford: Stanford Univ(irsity Press, 1974), pp.l49-50. 
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architecturally and in the nature of their spirits. The names of the dead may be 
known, unlike true ghosts, but they suffer similarly from the lack of a proper 
place on an ancestral altar. Even such a magnificent goddess as Mazu had a 
very similar story of origin. Unlike Mazu, however, Grandaunt Liu never 
enjoyed any state recognition, and maintained more of the ghostly aspects of a 
girls' temple. Yet, unlike those little shrines, she had a major local following 
of her own. Neither exactly a ghost nor a local religious worthy, she was 
clearly no bureaucrat in any sense. 
Temples to Pangu (sometimes called Panhu or Panwang) also dot the 
region, with at least five in the area around Thistle Mountain. Many Chinese 
know Pangu as a legendary creator of the world. Yet these local temples 
instead have close ties to Y ao origin myths, although my informants said that 
members of all ethnic groups worshipped there, at least in the early twentieth 
century. The local Pangu tradition stems from a confusion of names with 
Panhu, a dog described in the Hou Han Shu [History of the Later Han 
Dynasty].B The emperor offered his daughter in marriage to anyone who 
could quell a powerful bandit force. When the dog Panhu showed up one day 
with the bandit general's head in his jaws, the daughter insisted on keeping the 
promise. The odd couple's six sons and six daughters fathered the Yao. 
Tllis tale may contain elements of Han chauvinism, but Pangu!Panhu is 
quite clearly a central Y ao deity. Y ao informants in Guangxi told tales of 
Pangu helping them on legendary migrations through southern China, and 
showed me several ritual texts featuring Pangu. No version of Pangu resonates 
at all with the bureaucracy, and this one instead conjures up images of dog 
worship and totemic ancestors. The inevitable contact with non-Han groups in 
peripheral areas was one factor undermining the bureaucratic image. 
One other odd story rounds out the group. The Qiansa temple, an 
important nearby shrine, commemorated a vagrant who had thrown cow dung 
into a river. The dung transformed itself into rocks, creating a passage over the 
river.l4 Temples and stories like these were not unique to Thistle Mountain. 
Unlike Thistle Mountain, however, more central areas of the Chinese empire 
never allowed similar temples to develop on such a large scale, at least not 
without undergoing a transforming rectification first. In Guangxi, gods 
brazenly displayed their purely local loyalties (not one of the major popular 
deities had state recognition), their willingness to use brute force to compel 
worship (demanding, like King Gan, a gift of official clothes), and their close 
ties with death and desire - from matricidal King Gan to suicidal lovers to 
dead virgins. 
13 
14 
Lu Simian, Lu Simian dushi zaji [Lu Simian's Notes on Reading History] (Shanghai : 
Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1982), pp.1-7. 
Personal communication, Zhong Wendian, Department of History, Guangxi Normal 
University. 
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Weak States 
The consistent undermining of the bureaucratic metaphor at this place and · 
time suggests that the local secular bureaucracy itself was struggling for 
control. Indeed, the mechanisms that might ordinarily allow the state to 
tighten the reins on local worship were collapsing in peripheral Guangxi in the 
1840s. Thistle Mountain shared many of the characteristics of Chinese internal 
peripheries that sapped official power, and the events of the time had further 
weakened the state. · 
Like many comparable parts of China, east-central Guangxi had large 
populations of non-Han minorities. A large population of Yao maintained 
many of their own traditions, and practised swidden agriculture high in the 
mountains. An even larger group of Zhuang had been largely sinicized by the 
mid-nineteenth century, but still spoke Zhuang. They also retained some 
Zhuang traditions, like the paired singing of young couples that had inspired 
the story of the Liuwu temple. There were also some Cantonese-speaking 
Chinese (or perhaps fully sinicized Zhuang) and a large group of fairly recent 
Hakka immigrants. As usual in such situations, exchange among these groups 
accompanied their inherent tensions. 15 Yao spirit mediums and healers, for 
example, had a broad influence, as did their Pangu temples. Many people were 
bilingual- Hakka and Zhuang people communicated in Cantonese.l6 By the 
1840s, the pax sinica that had kept ethnic tensions down to a simmer began to 
break down in the area, providing further evidence of weakening state control. 
Large-scale ethnic feuding became endemic during this decade, with battles 
sometimes involving thousands of people. 17 
Typically peripheral, the area itself was physically cut off even from the 
nearest county seat. When I travelled there using modem transportation in 
1985, the trip still required almost half a day, beginning with a ferry ride 
(there are no bridges in the area), a long drive until we abandoned the car 
where it became stuck in the mud, a wet walk to a rickety little ferry, and a 
final walk to the local settlement. In the 1840s the county seat (itself 
considered a backwater) had little direct control over areas like Thistle 
Mountain. The lack of any significant inland naval force further weakened the 
chances for control, as the state often ceded domination of the main water 
transport routes to pirates. 
15 
16 
17 
For examples involving religious ideas in Taiwan, see John Shepherd, 'Sinicized Siraya 
Worship of A-li-tsu ' , Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology (Academia Sinica), no.58 
(1984), pp.1-81; and Gary Seaman, Temple Organization in a Chinese Village. Asian 
Folklore and Social Life Monographs, vol.101 (Taipei: Orient Cultural Service, 1978), 
p.114. 
Xia Jingyi (compiler), Xunzhou Fuzhi,juan 54:77. 
Philip A. Kuhn, 'Origins of the Taiping Vision: Cross-cultural Dimensions of a Chinese 
Rebellion', Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol.19 (1977), pp.350-66. 
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Indeed, local gazetteers lamented a startling increase in river piracy and 
bandit attacks during this period. With names like Big-head Goat, Big Carp, 
and Wild Boar Arrow, bandit leaders led gangs numbering in the hundreds and 
more.JS One disheartened contemporary suggested that thirty to forty per cent 
of the province practised banditry by 1854.19 The sudden surge in river piracy 
and other banditry in the 1840s resulted indirectly from the Opium War, which 
had put many inland water workers out of business by opening up new ports. 
Many of these people put their old skills to new uses, moving from the trade 
routes of Guangdong to the safer bandit havens of peripheral Guangxi.20 At 
the same time, the reopening of some played-out silver mines brought another 
group of rootless and hardened vagrants into the area.21 The inexorable rise of 
the Taiping rebellion at the end of this decade, trampling over feeble state 
attempts to stop it, illustrated just how weak the state really was by then. 
As these changes increasingly immobilized state control over the area in 
the 1840s, new local strongmen rose to exercise their own alternative 
authority. The first references to what local sources called 'rice lords' (mifan 
zhu) appeared at the beginning of this decade.22 In fact, they offered examples 
of the much broader pattern of Chinese peripheral strongmen that Johanna 
Meskill has described.23 Usually wealthy and well-connected to begin with, 
such strongmen controlled private forces of armed braves, servrng- as both 
local patrons and plunderers. They managed local institutions at the same time 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Xia Jingyi (compiler), Xunzhou fuzhi, juan 55; Qiu Bin (compiler), Pingnan xianzhi 
[Pingnan County Gazetteer] (1883), juan 18; Xie Xingyao, Taiping tianguo qianhou 
Guangxi de fan Qing yundong [Anti-Qing Movements in Guangxi Around the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom] (Beijing: Renrnin chubanshe, 1950). 
Yan Zhengji, 'Lun yuexi zei Qing bing shi shirno' [All About the Guangxi Bandits and 
the Qing Army], in Taiping tianguo lishi bowuguan (compiler), Taiping tianguo shiliao 
zongpian jianji [Selected Historical Sources on the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom] , vol.2. 
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962 [1854]). 
Xie Xingyao, Taiping tianguo qianhou; Frederic Wakeman, Strangers at the Gate: 
Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1966), p.126. 
Liang Renbao, 'Taiping tianguo he kuanggong' [The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and 
Miners], in Guangxi taiping tianguoshi yanjiuhui (ed.), Taiping tianguoshi yanjiu 
wenxuan [Selected Research on the History of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom] 
(Nanning: Guangxi renrnin chubanshe, 1981 [1957]), pp.50-64; Liang Jixiang 
(compiler), Guixian zhi, [Gui County Gazetteer], juan 1:12. 
Zhong Wendian, Mifan zhu sanlun [Some Thoughts on 'Rice Lords'] , paper presented at 
Jindai Zhongguo huitang wenti xueshu taolunhui, 1984; Xie Xiangyao, Taiping tianguo 
qianhou, pp.32-5. 
Johanna Menzel Meskill, A Chinese Pioneer Family: The Lins of Wu-feng, Taiwan, 
1729-1895 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.88-91. 
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as they preyed on their enemies. The strongest ran private empires, controlling 
both armed force and wealth, and effectively replacing civil government in 
some places. 
This coincidence of timing, where a feeble officialdom accompanied a 
rising panoply of unexpected gods, suggests that the bureaucratic metaphor 
thrives mostly where the state itself is strong and effective. The data from 
Guangxi on the eve of the Taiping rebellion suggest, at least as a first and 
tentative hypothesis, a kind of Skinnerian regional variation in gods. Core 
areas, with a strong state presence closely integrated with local elites, helped 
shape gods toward the bureaucratic model. Peripheral areas, however, with 
their non-Han influences, difficult transport, and alternative authorities, left 
the field open to gods beyond the bureaucracy.24 Kenneth Dean sees a similar 
pattern in Fujian, where cults with the closest ties to official Daoist and 
government circles thrived closest to administrative centres, while strictly 
local cults prospered in more peripheral regions.25 
While regional variation cannot explain all the permutations of Chinese 
deities, as I will show for Taiwanese ghosts below, it does begin to suggest 
how religious alternatives relate to social and political contexts. At the same 
time, however, peripheral religion in nineteenth-century Guangxi offered little 
true innovation. Even its strangest features existed as hints lying in the chinks 
of more central religious practice elsewhere in China. While some of the 
deities abandoned the bureaucratic metaphor (like a dung-tossing beggar or 
dead lovers), the most important deities carried on a hidden dialogue with the 
bureaucracy, as the localism of the Three Generations and the criminal/official 
career of King Gan grew significant only by contrast to more official deities. 
This was no new language of religion, incomprehensible to more central areas, 
but instead a very different proportioning of ideas with a broad base 
throughout China. The keys to the variation lay both in sources of political 
authority, and in an unsystematic but widely shared set of ideas. 
24 
25 
Note that this variation is less true for the goddesses. The state never opposed goddesses 
in the pantheon, but happily accepted many of them, even though real women were 
never bureaucrats. Goddesses could still be held up as paragons of loyalty or kindness. 
Yet there was political pressure even on goddesses. Many female deities combine the 
image of a loving mother with that of a threatening wife. They may appear holding 
babies, but many died as virgins - a fundamental breach of filial piety. Mazu (who 
began as such a dead virgin) went through the cleansing of successive state deifications. 
Grandaunt Liu, on -the other hand, was able to achieve prominence in her relatively 
threatening form only in a place like peripheral Guangxi in the 1840s. 
Kenneth Dean, Taoist Ritual and Popular Cults of Southeast China (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), p.32. 
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Mischief and Biased Wealth 
Taiwan in the 1980s was no economic periphery, nor was the state at all weak 
by any standard definitions. Yet the 1980s saw skyrocketing worship of 
another set of spirits that undermined the idea of bureaucracy. Popular religion 
in Taiwan had increased hand in hand with economic development, quite in 
contrast with the prescriptions of earlier modernization theories.26 Yet in the 
1980s, when Taiwan stood on the verge of recognition as a fully 'developed' 
country, the fastest growing segment of popular religion involved spirits of 
bandits, drunkards, unknown corpses and others who offered little help to 
bureaucratic propriety.27 Hardly any place in China could be more different 
from 1840s Guangxi - socially, politically, and economically - but both 
pushed religion in directions that seem far from our usual model. 
Perhaps a century ago, or perhaps much longer (no one really knows), a 
fishing boat washed up on the shore at the northernmost tip of Taiwan. The 
local people had no idea who the seventeen corpses on the boat might be, nor 
how the dog that accompanied them had remained alive. They followed the 
usual tradition when one stumbles across bodies or unknown bones in Taiwan: 
they buried the men in a common grave and erected a tiny shrine so that 
people might make occasional offerings to these otherwise unworshipped and 
pitiful spirits. The only odd bit of the story concerned the dog, whose 
unbreakable loyalty to his masters caused him to leap into the grave along 
with the bodies, to be buried alive by the villagers. The dog was the eighteenth 
of what the local people politely (and euphemistically) named the Eighteen 
Lords (Shiba Wanggong). 
The little shrine followed the fate of most such ghost temples, gradually 
deteriorating over the years, and receiving only occasional worship. By the 
1960s, it was little more than a vague mound with a gravestone and an incense 
pot, occasionally worshipped by a bored soldier standing coastal sentry duty. 
A decade later, however, its transformation commenced. Taiwan began to 
build its first nuclear power plant not far away, and the little grave was slated 
for destruction as the bulldozers strengthened the cliffs along the shore. When 
a number of accidents began occurring on the site, some of the workers began 
to worry about ghosts. Their fears were confirmed one day when a backhoe, 
poised to tear up the Eighteen Lords' grave, suddenly froze and defeated all 
attempts at repair. At this point, workers and local inhabitants mobilized in 
26 
27 
Qu Haiyuan and Yao Lixiang, 'Taiwan diqu zongjiao bianqian zhi tantao ' [Discussion of 
Religious Changes in the Taiwan Area], Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology (Academia 
Sinica), no.75 (1986), pp.655-85. 
Li Yih-yuan, 'Taiwan minjian zongjiao de xiandai qushi: .dui Peter Berger jiaoshou 
dongya fazhan wenhua yinsu lun de huiying' [The Modern Tendencies of Taiwan's 
Popular Religion: A Response to Professor Peter Berger's Theory of Cultural Factors in 
East Asian Development], unpublished (1988). 
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defense of the shrine. The government finally gave in, agreeing to 'respect 
local customs' and to recreate the shrine at the new, higher ground level. 
Not only had the previously forgotten shrine brought the state itself to do 
its bidding, it had done so in front of an audience of workers from all over 
Taiwan. Community and worker pressure pushed planners to make the newly 
rebuilt temple larger and fancier than any ghost temple previously built in 
Taiwan. Within a few years it rivalled the island's most important god temples 
in popularity, attracting thousands of people every night, and thoroughly tying 
up traffic on the coastal road for hours. While ghosts have been transformed 
into gods by worshippers in the past, these eighteen continued to celebrate 
their ghostliness on a grander scale than ever before, often brazenly inverting 
standard bureaucratic god practice. 28 
Even though half of the new temple had god images of the Eighteen 
Lords, the main centre of worship remained the grave mound and two larger-
than-life bronze statues of the dog that flanked it. The dogs themselves 
attracted most attention, as members of the invariably raucous crowd would 
stroke them and empower amulets by rubbing them over the dogs. Worship 
peaked in the small hours of the morning (the yin, ghostly time) instead of the 
daylight of the yang gods. Even more unusual, the original grave had been 
preserved as an underground room, directly below the replica with its dog 
statues. Those who knew about the basement room would go down there to 
experience the Eighteen Lords' power even more strongly. The necessities of 
the temple's construction at a higher ground level meant that the original 
grave and its incense pot now pushed up directly against a subterranean wall, 
leaving little room for worshippers to stand or kneel. To top it off, people 
would offer a burning cigarette rather than sticks of incense in the pot. 
Worshipping underground and late at night, fondling a bronze dog, and 
offering cigarettes in lieu of incense, the cult of the Eighteen Lords turned 
bureaucratic god worship on its head. 
Ghosts will do anything in exchange for worship - unlike proper 
bureaucratic dieties, who will not deal with improper requests. Ghost shrines 
have the reputation of pandering especially to those who cannot go to the 
official-like gods, like gangsters, gamblers and prostitutes. The Eighteen 
Lords played up to this reputation. So many people went that they could not 
all have been underworld figures, but clearly people found a thrill in going to a 
temple that claimed this element of disreputability and danger. Visitors are 
always warned about pickpockets, who frequent the place both to worship and 
to ply their trade in the thick crowds. The very carnival atmosphere at this 
temple plays up the contrast to other gods; there are even real carnival 
attractions on the way from the parking lot to the temple. 
Relations with the Eighteen Lords have resembled contracts with 
mobsters more than the respectful petitions to proper gods. The Eighteen 
28 On ghosts being transformed into dieties, see C. Stevan Harrell, 'When a Ghost Becomes 
a God' , in Wolf, Religion and Ritual, pp. l93-206. 
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Lords would do anything at all, but punishment for not paying them was quick 
and dire. Proper gods, on the other hand, respond out of goodness to 
appropriate requests (although they are happy to accept appropriate gifts in 
return). Many of the requests to the Eighteen Lords concerned profit (to which 
even the stuffiest gods have no objection in China), but especially profit from 
gainbling on an illegal lottery, or a killing from the stock-market craze that 
swept Taiwan in those years, or from less than strictly respectable business 
practices. 
This temple was the largest and most famous of its kind, but it was far 
from unique. Several other ghost temples also achieved some prominence at 
roughly the same time, and a great many saw increased worship because of 
their success at stock-market and gambling advice. At least three tombs to 
typically ghostly violent deaths became quite important. The closest to 
respectability was Li Y ong, a general killed fighting aborigines in the 
nineteenth century. More typical, during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, 
was the thief Liao Tianding, a sort of Robin Hood. He was murdered in his 
sleep by a brother-in-law who wanted the reward on his head. A similar shrine 
honours a mainland soldier who turned to bank robbery, supposedly to support 
a friend's child. He was shot by firing squad. While each of these has a 
generous side that has no part in the story of the Eighteen Lords (whose 
respectable bit was instead the loyalty of the dog), each died a ghostly death, 
thrived beyond official control, and maintained a very ghostly flexibility about 
honouring all kinds of requests. 
The same decade also brought a sudden popularity to a handful of gods -
invariably those who were least bureaucratic and most mischievous. As I was 
paying my bill at a restaurant one evening, the small altar near the cash 
register (typical of many Taiwanese businesses) caught my attention. An 
image of the Cloth-Bag Buddha (Budai Heshang) sat in the middle - the fat 
and jolly character with a big bag of goodies slung over his shoulder, all ready 
to hand out to people. He appears widely in Taiwan, but more as a decoration 
than an important object of worship. While some people say he was an 
incarnation of the future Buddha, Maitreya, they treat him more like Santa 
Claus. This image, however, had a burning cigarette hanging from his lips, 
strongly reminiscent of those cigarettes for the Eighteen Lords. Ceramic dog 
images bought at the Eighteen Lords temple also get burning cigarettes stuck 
in their mouths. 
The Cloth-Bag Buddha and his sack of presents readily symbolizes the 
idea of easy wealth that falls into one's lap. The woman who took my money 
in the restaurant described him as 'the God of Biased Wealth' (Piancai Shen), 
an innovative term to my knowledge, contrasting with the well-known 'God of 
Wealth' (Cai Shen). 'Biased wealth' is a technical term in Chinese fortune-
telling, wl-:.ich refers to unearned gains. The Cloth-Bag Buddha just hands out 
wealth willy-nilly, while the Eighteen Lords demand a contractual payment. 
Yet both celebrate sources of wealth outside any standard channels -:- and 
worship of them is linked by that irregular ritual of bu~ning cigarettes. Not 
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coincidentally, at the Eighteen Lords temple the next most popular sales items 
after the ceramic dogs are images of the Cloth-Bag Buddha. 
More standard gods have not been left out of the resurgence of popular 
religion in Taiwan, but a handful stand out from the rest for their rapid growth. 
In each case, the deity undermines the bureaucratic metaphor. The most 
important beneficiaries have been Ji Gong (the wine-besotted monk), Taizi Ye 
(Nuozha, the patricidal child), and Sun Wukong (popularized in the West as 
the mischievous Monkey).29 Officially registered Ji Gong temples, for 
example, increased in Taiwan from twelve to one hundred and twenty between 
1981 and 1986.30 It is safe to assume that a great many more remain 
unregistered. Like the Eighteen Lords and other ghostly temples, and like the 
God of Biased Wealth, these deities thrived in the 1980s because they would 
not be held to the proper moralities of the bureaucratic metaphor. 
This entire set of unbureaucratic deities happily gave stock-market tips, 
illegal lottery advice, and help in the shadier sides of the capitalist market. 
From executed bank robbers to unidentified corpses to a monk who mocks his 
own (already unbureaucratic) discipline, this group stands out for its challenge 
to bureaucratic order. Most of them are eccentrically individualistic, and none 
of them have the associations with community morality that typifies most gods 
in the standard metaphor. These particular gods' places of worship rarely 
functioned as community temples, and ghosts never played a role as 
organizers of communities. Their followers constituted neither congregation 
nor community, as the deities themselves stood idiosyncratically independent 
from organized lines of power. 
Gambling and Modernity 
Like east-central Guangxi in the 1840s, Taiwan in the 1980s lavished its 
worship on a collection of quirky and ominous characters, at least in 
comparison with upright bureaucrats. The deteriorating state in Guangxi 
provided a pivot for an explanation there, but Taiwan's political system 
certainly showed no similar signs of weakness (unless one somehow takes 
increasing democracy for weakness). The explanation instead lies in the 
specific nature of Taiwan's economy during that decade, and in the inability 
of a modernizing government to maintain its influence over religion. 
This embodiment of religious individualism in Taiwan - where 
community gods lost ground to deities with no community basis, serving the 
selfish ends of isolated individuals - grew at exactly the same time as 
Taiwan's small-enterprise-based capitalism has thrived. The relationship of 
29 Hu T'ai-li, 'Shen, gui yu dutu: dajia le duxi fanying zhi minsu xinyang' [Gods, Ghosts 
and Gamblers: The Influence of Popular Beliefs on Everybody's Happy Lottery], paper 
presented at the Second International Conference on Sinology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 
1986. 
30 Ibid. 
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the individual to the marketplace in capitalism, with its associated breakdown 
of communal ties, has been recognized since Marx's writings on alienation 
and Durkheim's on anomie. The situation grew particularly intense in Taiwan 
in the 1980s, when many people felt that rising labour costs and a changing 
world market threatened the small, labour-intensive enterprises on which they 
had built their wealth. While they recognized the threat, they saw no plausible 
alternative kinds of investment. The result was a huge increase in 
unproductive investment - the booming illegal lottery, an exploding stock-
market, and skyrocketing land prices. The boom in unearned wealth finally 
went bust in 1990, when the stock-market lost seventy-five per cent of its 
value. 
For much of the 1980s, profit appeared less as a product of hard work and 
smart decisions, and more as a result of luck, greed and insider connections. 
At the same time, the crisis of economic confidence accentuated the common 
tooth-and-claw image of the economy as one side of petty entrepreneurial 
competition. With small business under tight pressure, and with the stock-
market and gambling dens booming, success appeared increasingly as the 
result of self-serving utilitarianism rather than community morality. That is, it 
fit desperate ghosts and idiosyncratic gods more than moralizing bureaucrats. 
These capricious deities matched the capricious nature of profit itself. What 
had been an odd, weak undercurrent in popular religion had a stronger pull 
than the more standard gods in the unusual conditions of that one decade. 
China had long had a developed commodity economy and clear ideas 
about individual competition, along with the more standard Confucian ideas of 
hierarchy and order. Yet a strong state and traditional elite apparently held the 
religious side of the market economy in check, at least in the more central 
parts of China. It burst its bonds in modem Taiwan because the state had given 
up almost all control over religious interpretation, although it was in no sense 
politically weak like the state in Guangxi a century earlier. From the founding 
of the Republic of China in 1911, its leaders had been dedicated modernizers, 
as much in the cultural as the economic sense. Their resulting dedication to 
'rationality' over 'superstition', along with their Western-style guarantees of 
religious freedom, resulted in the sanctioning of organized textual traditions as 
religion, while most popular practice was damned as superstition, and 
discouraged. 31 
The official approval of religious freedom but discouragement of 
'irrational' ideas led to numerous halting and ineffectual attempts at religious 
control after the Nationalist Party regained the island from Japan.32 None of 
31 
32 
Prasenjit Duara, 'Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of Modernity: The Campaigns 
Against Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-century China', Journal of Asian Studies, 
vo1.50 (1991), pp.67-83. See also Robert P. Weller, Resistance, Chaos and Control in 
China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994), pp.176-80. 
Robert P. Weller, 'Bandits, Beggars and Ghosts: The Failure of State Control over 
Religious Interpretation in Taiwan', American Ethnologist, vol.12 (1985), pp.46-61. 
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this was systematic, however, and the real increase of civil liberties in the 
1980s undercut all attempts at religious control. By renouncing a religion of its 
own and embracing Weberian rational bureaucratic principles, a modernizing 
state like Taiwan finds it very difficult even to attempt to influence religious 
interpretation. Unwilling to actively discourage popular religion by the 1980s, 
its only real option was to ignore popular beliefs. While state and elite control 
over religion had been weak in late imperial times, it collapsed completely in 
modern Taiwan, and the absence allowed a new apportioning of religious 
practice. By basing its legitimacy on bureaucratic rationality, the state had 
undermined its claims about ultimate values, leaving a void that religion has 
stepped in to fill. In a very limited but important sense, then, Taiwan's state in 
the 1980s was just as weak as Guangxi's in the 1840s- for both had lost any 
significant control over popular religious practice. 
Conclusions 
These two cases of how unusual deities rivalled and even overshadowed their 
staid and bureaucratic godly colleagues occurred in two places that were as 
different as could be and still be Chinese. Guangxi in the 1840s was a 
peripheral frontier with a collapsing social and political order, about to be torn 
apart by one of the largest rebellions in history. Taiwan in the 1980s was a 
political centre with a thriving modern economy. Yet both places embraced 
spirits of questionable Confucian morality, known more for suspect deaths, 
sex, drunkenness and gambling than for dedication to bureaucratic order. 
Could the same processes really have been at work in both places? 
Negotiating Power: Neither Guangxi nor Taiwan invented new kinds of 
gods. Odd as they were in relation to the standard bureaucratic metaphor, they 
still would have had some familiarity to Chinese anywhere. China, after all, 
always had competing and complex social, economic and political worlds -
from the undercurrents of competition and jealousy in the ideally harmonious 
family, to the political and even military control of local elites beneath the 
state, to markets and individual profit motives in a system that officially 
frowned on merchants. Added to the absence of effective, unified control over 
religious interpretation, it should be no surprise that an undercurrent flowed 
through Chinese religion everywhere. From seductive fox fairies to patricidal 
sons, a hint of desire unbound lay in the cracks of a religion that claimed to 
worship upright officials. 
The collapse of political control over religion in both Guangxi and 
Taiwan brought this hidden side of religion strongly to the surface. The 
Guangxi case suggested that a Skinnerian regionalization of China might also 
map variations in the power of the bureaucratic metaphor, where peripheral 
areas encourage gods beyond the bureaucracy. Adding the Taiwan case, 
however, allows us to focus more clearly on just one aspect of regional 
variation - the nature of political control. Nineteenth-century Guangxi 
resembled modern Taiwan only in the frailty of state control over religion, and 
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not in other major features of regional variation like geographic marginality or 
economic system. Such political weakness may develop more easily on 
peripheries, but the periphery is only one form of weakness. Peripheries 
themselves will vary historically along these lines, with the 1840s marking a 
low point for Guangxi. At the same time, Taiwan shows how a very 
comparable weakness can develop from quite different roots - the specific 
politics of modernity in a strong state rather than the strongman politics of a 
collapsed state. 
Not surprisingly, these two examples suggest that the bureaucratic 
metaphor dominates hidden desires especially where the bureaucracy itself 
dominates alternative social and political arrangements. Weak though state 
and local elite control over religion was in China, it did manage to keep 
alternative gods on the sidelines when it held the upper hand. Where other 
forms of power began to take over, from local strongmen to a fickle market, 
the mechanisms of attempted control faltered. In short, these cases clearly 
suggest that gods beyond the bureaucracy thrived, especially where the state 
began to lose the struggle for overarching control. 
The situation is more complex than just bureaucratic versus 
unbureaucratic gods. The two cases I have discussed, after all, were very 
different from each other, although neither featured bureaucratic gods. 
Guangxi developed its own versions of community cults to major gods, 
preferring hermits and a matricidal rogue to capture the usual role of 
bureaucrats. Even the Taiping Christian God who showed up in the 1840s was 
another unbureaucratic god who oversaw a communitarian congregation. In 
Taiwan, on the other hand, standard community gods held their own, while the 
newly popular deities catered entirely to individual followers with no claims 
to community. Guangxi saw an unbureaucratic self-definition of community, 
while Taiwan played up idiosyncratic gods and hungry ghosts who never 
defined communities. In Guangxi, the state had collapsed and left the field 
open for new community identities. In Taiwan, however, state power in 
communities was as strong as ever, but a kind of capricious capitalism had 
thrived. Ghosts and pariah gods fit neatly with the idea of an amoral 
individualism that saw greed held back only by the threat of enforcers to carry 
out contracts. The particular nature of weak state control over religion thus 
relates closely to just how gods move beyond the bureaucracy, leading to very 
different patterns in Guangxi and Taiwan. 
Do any of these alternatives to the metaphor of gods as bureaucrats 
constitute a kind of counter-hegemony? While the apparently systematic 
rejection of bureaucracy makes the claim tempting, neither case allows a 
simple affirmative answer. Guangxi not only retained the community structure 
of standard god temples, but many of its deities derived their significance by 
way of contrast with bureaucrats, thus relying on the system they questioned. 
King Gan certainly undermined the bureaucracy; yet he also drew his power 
from the bureaucracy - gaining legitimacy both by humiliating. a real official 
and by working as an official himself. In Taiwan, the bureaucratic gods 
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continue to thrive; the explosion of interest in gods beyond the bureaucracy 
supplements the system without fundamentally changing it. 
Yet the very existence of these alternatives at least provides the kernel of 
an entirely new view of the world. Taiping ideas, which were certainly radical 
by Chinese standards (monotheism, egalitarian economics, and even a ban on 
sexual intercourse), thrived in the same fertile fields as King Gan. By 
redefining community values, Guangxi planted the seeds of possible 
alternatives. Taiwan's innovations, however, involved individuals each out for 
their own gain, and it is much harder to see how an organized movement for 
change might grow out of alienated ghosts. Nor does any radical change in 
religion seem likely unless bureaucratic gods themselves begin to disappear. 
These religious variants thus not only reflect political and economic changes; 
the religious form itself also shapes political potentials. 
Unruly Ideas: Religion defines values and shapes identity. As a result, it 
forms a natural part of the negotiation of power and self, from the level of the 
family to the nation as a whole. Religious variation correlates with broader 
social variation because religion actively shapes the definition of the world, 
not because it simply reflects society in a naive Durkheimian way. 
Yet not all religions appear to permit variation to the same degree as 
Chinese religion. The key to Chinese religion's great flexibility is the lack of a 
powerfully unified orthodoxy. Had China ever succeeded in rooting out all 
alternatives to the bureaucratic metaphor, it would have ended up with a 
powerful religious tool of the state so tied to the imperial system that a flexible 
response to the changing political conditions of the twentieth century would 
have been difficult. In great contrast to the Western traditions, Chinese 
memorized no catechisms and made no confessions; most temples had no 
priests, and most priests had no congregations. Much of the mechanism of 
interpretive control in Christianity, Judaism or Islam was absent in China. The 
meaning of a complex ritual or of a god would always be up for grabs. 
Even the storytellers, opera troupes and popular novels that carried much 
information about the gods were wide open to variant performances and 
readings. Stories about a god in a temple, for example, might take a very 
different line from stories about the same god in a vernacular novel like 
Fengshen Yanyi. Such media, in conjunction with ritual performance and local 
stories, constituted the primary means for disseminating the complex and 
contradictory images of gods, and for promoting specific local variants. 
None of these complexities prevented people from trying to push religious 
interpretation in certain directions. But the amorphous control over meaning 
did make it nearly impossible for them to succeed completely. The late 
imperial state made the most obvious attempts to push its own versions of 
things. Yet the state cult itself had little effect beyond the officials who ran it, 
and state cooptation of deities by granting them official rank still left plenty of 
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room for alternative interpretations on the ground.33 The state apparently 
succeeded in promoting a bureaucratic understanding of gods 'Where i t was 
strong, but even then alternative· interpretations waited in the shadows. 
. The result for China was the lack of either a shared orthodoxy or a shared 
set of structuralist ruling ideas. Yet China also clearly had a unified religion, 
in the sense that variations drew on a set of commc;m themes. The bureaucratic 
metaphor did not dominate at all times or in all places, but everyone 
recognized it. The set of alternatives, contradictions and inconsistencies also 
spread widely. Dead virgins, parent killers and unidentified corpses occur over 
and over; and bring up contradictions in real family and political relationships 
that the metaphor of gods as bureaucrats covers up. The very unruly nature of 
this set of ideas has given Chinese religion the power to adjust to radically 
new kinds of social conditions, In contra,st to the old state cult, wb.ich naturally 
died with the old state, change without transformation has been easy for 
popular religion largely because gods beyond the bureaucracy kept the doors 
open. 
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